Occasionally, British figures including Mervyn King and Alistair Darling are to be glimpsed in these photos, reminding us that we Brits have been ardent deregulators, as well. Their financial capacity far outstrips their capacity for enjoying themselves. They look uneasy, shifty, in weirdly ill-fitting suits, as if they are oppressed by the scrutiny, and worn out, possibly, by the strain of suppressing their own scruples. The director shows how their body-language is always the same: somehow more guilty-looking when they are in the White House rose garden in their career pomp, being introduced to the press, than when they are facing openly hostile Senate hearings. Perhaps only the pen of Tom Wolfe could do justice to these harassed, bald, middle-aged masters of the universe, as they appear in Ferguson's film. Bank CEOs become government officials, creating laws convenient for their once and future employers. There is a revolving door between the banks and the higher reaches of government, and to some extent the groves of academe. This is what Ferguson means by "inside job". Asked by Ferguson if he has any regrets about his behaviour, he says: "I have no comments … uh, no regrets." One splutters with vexation another gives vent to a ripe Freudian slip. It is really something to see the expression of shock, outrage and fear on their faces as they realise they're in the dock. Ferguson speaks to many of these economists, who clearly thought they were going to be interviewed as wry, dispassionate observers. The banks bought the prestige of the academics, and their universities' prestige, too. They were massively paid for these consultancies. Distinguished economists from America's Ivy League universities were drafted in by banks to compose reports sycophantically supporting reckless deregulation. Perhaps the most sensational aspect of this film is Ferguson's contention that the crash corrupted the discipline of economics itself. Chillingly, the banks now had a vested interest in selling insanely risky products, as they themselves were lavishly insured with these swaps. Ferguson argues that crucially, the banks were allowed to insure against bad debts with credit default swaps – any number of these insurance policies could be purchased against one particular risk. They offered their traders mind-blowing bonuses to encourage risk-taking chutzpah, corporate loyalty, and a neurotically driven pursuit of profit. Banks and loan companies were freer to gamble with their depositors' money they were themselves freer to borrow more they were free to offer investors dizzyingly complex financial instruments, with income streams from different debts bundled up, including high-interest home loans offered to high-risk borrowers – the so-called "sub-prime" market that offered mouthwateringly high returns. In the 1980s, the markets and financial services were deregulated, and the driving force for this liberalisation was Alan Greenspan, formidable chairman of the US federal reserve board from 1987 to 2006. Aided by some fascinating interviews, Ferguson lays out an awful story. This film is as gripping as any thriller. In 2008, the pop was heard around the world. As long as the bubble's getting bigger, there's no worry about the bubble contracting … right? But that is not what happens to bubbles. In Charles Ferguson's documentary about the great financial crash, Paulson's shrugging remark sums up the attitude of the super-rich banking apparatchiks and their eager political supporters. "If you're growing, you're not in recession … right?" The speaker is Hank Paulson, the former US treasury secretary, and, as it happens, the former CEO of Goldman Sachs.
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